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Evald Ilyenkov's philosophy revisited by Vesa Oittinen. 
Andrey Maidansky is a professor of philosophy at the University of Belgorod, Russia. He has 
published, in Russian, many books and articles on Baruch Spinoza, Marxism, and history of Soviet 
philosophy. One of his main interests is the well-known and controversial Soviet philosopher Evald 
Ilyenkov (1924–79), who left behind a vast archive of unpublished materials that will be published 
in a ten-volume collection edited by Maidansky. 
Vesa Oittinen is a professor at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland. He and 
Maidansky are longtime collaborators. They edited a book together on the activity approach in 
Soviet philosophy of the 1960s and ’70s, The Practical Essence of Man: The “Activity Approach” 
in Late Soviet Philosophy (Haymarket Books, 2017). 
 
Vesa Oittinen: The Soviet philosopher Evald Ilyenkov died in 1979. Since then, his fame has 
steadily grown, slowly at first, but he has received increasing international attention in the last few 
years. How would you explain this phenomenon? After all, Soviet philosophy in general has the 
reputation of being rather dull. 
Andrey Maidansky: Indeed, Ilyenkov’s popularity has been growing, especially over the last ten to 
fifteen years, while the rest of Soviet Marxism (with the exception of Lev Vygotsky’s cultural-
historical psychology) has practically turned into a museum piece. Almost every year we see new 
translations of Ilyenkov’s works, especially into English and Spanish. Recently, in Western Europe, 
the International Friends of Ilyenkov group was formed (their second symposium was held in 
Copenhagen the summer of 2018). 
I believe that two main factors contribute to the growing attraction of Ilyenkov’s works. 
First is a new wave of interest in Karl Marx and creative Marxism around the world, against a 
background of rapid social transformation, expectations of another economic crisis, and so on. And 
Ilyenkov managed to take the best from Marx—that is, Marx’s method of thinking and his critical 
spirit. In Ilyenkov’s work, there is minimal ideological veiling and scholasticism, which turns many 
intelligent people away from Marxism.Secondly, there remained many texts in Ilyenkov’s archive 
that he could not publish during his lifetime, and they were sometimes even more interesting than 
his published works. Here, I would mention his impressive Cosmology of the Spirit (which was 
recently translated into German and English for the first time); his writings on psychology and 
pedagogy; his study of the phenomenon of alienation of man in modern society (his critique of 
machine-like socialism is especially interesting); and his quest for historical ways of shedding 
alienation. The flow of publications of Ilyenkov’s manuscripts has continued unabated, rousing 
public curiosity. More than half of his handwritten heritage remained on his desk. He had not 
managed to print even his cherished Dialectics of the Ideal. 
VO: You mentioned the Cultural-Historical School of Soviet psychology (Aleksey Leontiev, Lev 
Vygotsky). Indeed, it seems that Ilyenkov was in many respects close to this school. The common 
ground between them was the theory of activity, or activity approach as it was called. 
AM: Yes, Ilyenkov considered himself a champion of this powerful school in psychology. He wrote 
about “the superiority of Vygotsky’s school over any other scheme of explaining the psyche,” 
explicitly associating himself with this school. Ilyenkov worked along the lines of Leontiev and Petr 
Galperin’s activity theory. This is one of the branches of Vygotsky’s school, which presents the 
psyche as a form of search and orienting activity in the outside world. In the case of human beings, 
this activity is performed in the world of cultural objects, artifacts, created by human labor. 
Ilyenkov was especially interested in the process of interiorization—the mechanics of enrooting 
(Vygotsky’s term) cultural functions within the individual (initially a nonhuman animal) psyche. At 
that moment, a human personality, or an own self, arises. This subtle process is seen especially 
clearly, as in a slow-motion film, in the Zagorsk experiment with deaf-blind children. Ilyenkov 
devoted more than ten years of his life to this experiment. After his tragic death (he committed 
suicide in 1979), his deaf-blind student Sasha Suvorov wrote a poem-dialogue, “The Focus of 
Pain,” about her teacher and another student, Natasha Korneeva, named her daughter Evaldina. 
VO: Despite these affinities to the Soviet cultural-historical psychology, Ilyenkov was not a 
psychologist, but a philosopher. I believe we might say that it was he who started the activity 
approach in Soviet philosophy, an approach that previously was applied only in psychology? 
AM: Ilyenkov was primarily a philosopher, of course, and in the field of psychology he dealt 
mainly with the problems of general methodological order: how the psyche is formed and what its 
primary “germ cell” is, what personality is, and so on. 
As for the activity approach, it was formally declared in textbooks of Marxist philosophy, with 
relevant quotes from Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach about objective-practical activity and the need 
not only to interpret the world but to change it. The term activity approach is not used in textbooks, 
but Ilyenkov did not use it either (activity as an adjective, dejatel’nostnyj, does not occur in his 
works at all). Nonetheless, it was Ilyenkov who first turned his attention to the challenge of 
explaining the genesis and structure of human thought on the basis of objective activity—labor. 
In the most general terms, the case appeared to him as follows. Human labor, as it were, turns 
natural phenomena inside out, revealing in practice the pure (ideal) forms of things. And only 
afterward, these forms, melted in the “retort of civilization,” imprint themselves on the human mind 
as “ideas.” The practical changing of the world serves as the basis and source of both artistic 
perception and logical thought, as well as of all specifically human abilities. 
This principle was adopted by Ilyenkov’s talented students—Yury Davydov, Lev Naumenko, 
Genrikh Batishchev, and some others. Unfortunately, their main works were not translated into 
foreign languages. An English reader can get an idea of them perhaps, but only from the book we 
edited a couple of years ago. 
VO: Ilyenkov thus was not only a professional philosopher, but also wanted his ideas concerning 
the role of activity in education to be applied widely in Soviet society. Here, we can see a union of 
theory and practice. 
AM: It is true, Ilyenkov never was an armchair philosopher. During the Second World War, he 
served as an artilleryman, in peacetime he designed radio devices (including a huge tape recorder 
with excellent sound quality), and even installed a lathe in his study. He also worked a lot on 
economics and pedagogical psychology. 
Ilyenkov was tormented by the question: Why did the state not wither away in the socialist 
countries, contrary to Marx’s prediction? Why does society not evolve into a self-governing 
commune? On the contrary, the power of the state over the human personality grew tremendously. 
Ilyenkov concluded that in order to build a society with a so-called human face, human personality 
itself had to be transformed. Hence his keen interest in the Zagorsk experiment with deaf-blind 
children, in which the principles of nurturing a new kind of personality could be honed and tested in 
practice. Cultural-historical psychology and developing pedagogy should teach us how to form a 
harmonious personality, one that could shed the yoke of megamachines of alienation—the state and 
the market. 
Someone might call it a pedagogical utopia. Maybe. But, as Oscar Wilde said, “a map of the world 
that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which 
Humanity is always landing.” 
VO: Seen from today’s perspective, Ilyenkov’s most original contribution to Marxist philosophy 
was perhaps the concept of the ideal, a concept that has since then been much debated. 
AM: The 1962 publication of Ilyenkov’s article “The Ideal” in the Philosophical Encyclopedia 
caused a huge upsurge of controversy in the Soviet philosophical community. The ideological iron 
curtain prevented discussion of it reaching beyond the Soviet Union. Ilyenkov’s most important 
work on that subject was fully translated into English only quite recently and published in 
Dialectics of the Ideal, with comments clarifying the polemical context around the notion of the 
ideal. 
The fate of this late manuscript was not simple. The director of the Institute of Philosophy, a former 
Communist Party official Boris Ukraintsev, did not allow Dialectics of the Ideal to be printed for 
several years. The manuscript was published only posthumously, after being abridged and under a 
modified title. So, Dialectics of the Ideal brought Roland Barthes’s hyperbole into practice: the 
reader’s birth had to be paid for by the death of the author. 
This 1979 publication heaped fuel on the controversy around the concept of the ideal. Mikhail 
Lifshits, a coryphaeus of Soviet aesthetics, joined in the dispute. Ilyenkov treated Lifshits with great 
respect. (By the way, Lifshits was also a close friend of Georg Lukács.) Lifshits spoke out against 
the activity understanding of the ideal. According to him, the concept of the ideal sets a standard of 
perfection for anything and is applicable to all and everything in nature. 
For his part, Ilyenkov saw in the ideal “a kind of stamp impressed on the substance of nature by 
social human life-activity.” Everything that falls within the circle of this life activity receives the 
“stamp” of ideality, becoming (while the activity persists) a dwelling place and a tool of the ideal. 
The cerebral cortex becomes an instrument of thought, silver and gold become money, and fire 
appears to be the deity of the hearth. Even the stars in the sky turn into zodiac signs, into a compass 
and a calendar. Ilyenkov calls the ideal a “relationship of representation” of things (of their inner 
essences and laws of existence, to be more precise) within the compass of human activity, within 
the process of producing social life. 
Ilyenkov was deeply interested in the problem of ideal social order. In his book On Idols and Ideals 
(1968), he attempted to draw the vector of the communist movement in the modern world. He 
understood communism as the process of transferring the functions of managing social life into the 
hands of individual people, or, in other words, as the process of replacing the market and state 
machines with a “self-governing organization.” The young Marx called it the “removal of 
alienation” and the “reappropriation of man” (der menschlichen Wiedergewinnung). 
To Ilyenkov’s chagrin, that very “cybernetic nightmare,” the idol of the Machine that so terrified 
him, appeared in the Soviet Union under the guise of the communist ideal. It was a machine-like 
socialism that was built in the country, instead of a society “with a human face.” I believe this 
undermined his will to live. George Orwell’s 1984 (which was banned in the Soviet Union) became 
his favorite book. Ilyenkov read it in German and even translated it into Russian for personal use. 
VO: Ilyenkov had the reputation of being a Hegelian Marxist. It seems to me, however, that he was 
not the same kind of Hegelian as, for example, the Abram Deborin school of the 1920s in early 
Soviet philosophy. Maybe we could compare him with Lukács? 
AM: As a philosopher, Ilyenkov grew up with Hegel’s books. He was deeply impressed by Hegel’s 
pamphlet Who Thinks Abstractly? He translated and commented on it twice in twenty years. At the 
same time, he reproached Hegel for thinking too abstractly—namely, for turning dialectic formulas 
into “a priori outlines” and for a “haughty and slighting attitude towards the world of empirically 
given facts, events, phenomena.” The leading lights of dialectical materialism (Ilyenkov mentions 
the names of Georgi Plekhanov, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong) inherited this original sin of 
idealism from Hegel. 
Ilyenkov made a similar rebuke against Plekhanov’s followers led by Deborin. These people created 
school courses of diamat and histmat (short for dialectical and historical materialism), which 
nauseated Ilyenkov. In Western literature, it is often claimed that Ilyenkov continued Deborin’s line 
in Marxist philosophy. Such opinion seems incorrect to me, although I do not deny the affinity 
between the two in their understanding of the subject of philosophy and certain categories of 
dialectics, as well as the fact that they have common sympathies for Hegel and Spinoza. 
Lukács is quite another matter. Ilyenkov valued his book Young Hegel and the Problems of 
Capitalist Society very highly; he translated and commented on it jointly with his students. In 
Ilyenkov’s archive, his review of Lukács’s Ontology of Social Being, from the early 1970s, is 
preserved. It is written with great respect for Lukács, who died in 1971, despite the fact that 
Ilyenkov was an implacable opponent of the ontologization of dialectics. In his eyes, Lukács is a 
representative of the best, most vibrant Marxist tradition, in contrast to the stillborn scholasticism of 
diamat. 
VO: You are at present editing the Collected Works of Ilyenkov. Could you tell me a bit more about 
this publication project? It would also be interesting to know whether the unpublished material from 
the Ilyenkov archive will affect the hitherto established image of his philosophy. 
AM: In February 2019, the first of ten volumes of Ilyenkov’s Collected Works appeared in Russian. 
We have prepared three more volumes for printing. Academic Vladislav Lektorsky, Ilyenkov’s 
daughter Elena Illesh, and I worked on them. 
Publication of the remaining materials from the Ilyenkov’s archive may add certain new features to 
his portrait, but it is unlikely to affect his current image significantly. The main part of his archive 
has already been published. Among the still unpublished works, I would single out the manuscript 
of his final book, which criticizes the technocratic project of building socialism, which Ilyenkov 
believed was being carried out in the Soviet Union. Since he was not allowed to criticize actual 
machine socialism directly, Ilyenkov argued with its ideologues, such as Alexander Bogdanov (V. I. 
Lenin’s closest ally, up to a certain period, and his opponent in philosophy) and the contemporary 
Polish Marxist Adam Schaff. 
However, Soviet censorship tightly blocked everything that was written by Ilyenkov on this topic. 
Only a year after his death was his last book published—and even so, in a heavily censored form 
and under a title chosen by some censor: Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism. 
VO: Yet a final and inevitable question: Do you see any lacunae or problematic points in Ilyenkov’s 
philosophy? 
AM: Great thinkers, like Ilyenkov, make intelligent mistakes. Their mistakes provide valuable 
material for reflection and indicate the growth points of a theory. That is, they are objective 
mistakes, conditioned by the spirit of the times and by contradictions in the very object of research, 
and not by a subjective weakness of the mind. 
There are problems over which Ilyenkov cudgeled his brain long and hard, but could not cope 
with—such as, for example, the already mentioned withering away of the state. And the most 
serious lacuna can be found in that area. Ilyenkov frequently and wittily criticized the idea of 
designing a “Machine smarter than man,” that is, a supercomputer capable of planning economic 
development and managing social life better than living people. However, he never raised the 
obvious (for Marxists) question: How can a programmable electronic machine help us in “removing 
alienation” and the “reappropriation of man”? If “the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal 
lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist” (Marx), then what society does a 
computer-based mill give us? 
To me, personally, the mental arguments with Ilyenkov are especially interesting and useful. The 
concept of “thinking body,” which Ilyenkov attributed to Spinoza, seems to me inadequate and 
confused (I had to wage a fierce debate with Ilyenkov’s students about that concept). Or, quite 
recently, in the pages of Mind, Culture, and Activity, I defended Vygotsky’s view of affect as a 
“germ cell” of psyche against Ilyenkov’s position, which considered sense image as such a “cell.” 
But even in such cases, I am accustomed to viewing things through lenses of logical categories 
polished by Ilyenkov. I have yet to encounter better theoretical optics. 
 
